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Abstract: In rhetoric, empathy – the ability to put oneself inside the interlocutor’s 
position in an argument – has been considered as the bridge between the orator and the 
interlocutors. Despite its crucial importance, no studies have addressed the challenge of 
operationalizing this concept, translating it into proxies that can be used for determining 
how empathic a dialogue is. This paper intends to propose a coding scheme for 
capturing two dimensions of empathy in dialogue – otherness and relevance. 
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1. Introduction   
The possibility of dialogue is rooted in the fundamental and basic capacity of 
understanding the interlocutor’s utterances. However, as the literature in linguistics 
clearly underscores (Clark, 1996; Grice, 1957; Leech, 1983; Levinson, 1983; Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995), this understanding does not correspond to the decoding of the sentence 
conveyed, retrieving a proposition through the use of the rules of grammar and a 
dictionary. Using an example from Gibbs (Gibbs, 1987, p. 591), the interpretation of the 
following exchange would be impossible if we consider only the so-called “literal 
meaning,” or if we conceived meaning only as a property of expressions in abstraction 
from particular situations, speakers, or hearers (Leech, 1983, p. 6):  
 
Bob: Would you like a piece of cake? 
Peter: I’m on a diet. 
 
This dialogue presupposes not only the analysis of the context in which it occurs, but 
also the mutual availability of specific knowledge that allows Bob to understand from 
Peter’s sharing of personal information concerning the issue of diet that he refuses his 
offer. The interpretation of Peter’s utterance is grounded on a set of assumptions 
concerning what a diet is and more importantly what people do (and do not do) when 
they are on diet. Without this information, this dialogue would appear pure nonsense.  
This dimension of meaning and understanding defines the way we communicate. 
In a sense, the possibility of communication rests on what we do not communicate, 
namely what is taken for granted in our discourse. This awareness led to a concept that 
is becoming crucial in a world characterized by the meeting of different cultures, 
namely “cultural literacy.” In commenting on the capacity of understanding a literary 
text, Hirsch observed that the ability of decoding the writing and the knowledge of the 
definitions of the words used is not self-sufficient. To be able to understand a text (or a 
piece of discourse), a reader (or a speaker) needs to have access to the information that 
it presupposes (Hirsch, 1983, p. 165):  
 
Every writer is aware that the subtlety and complexity of what can be conveyed 
in writing depends on the amount of relevant tacit knowledge that can be 
assumed ln readers. As psycholinguists have shown, the explicitly stated words 
on the page often represent the smaller part of the literary transaction. […] 
[W]ithout appropriate, tacitly shared background knowledge, people cannot 
understand newspapers. A certain extent of shared, canonical knowledge is 
inherently necessary to a literate democracy. For this canonical information I 
have proposed the term “cultural literacy.” lt is the translinguistic knowledge on 
which linguistic literacy depends. 
 
This “tacitly shared,” “translinguistic” background knowledge is nothing but the 
transposition of the philosophical and linguistic concept of common (or mutual) 
knowledge to the field of literacy studies. In philosophy of language and pragmatics, 
one of the fundamental assumptions underlying the mechanism of speaker-hearer 
comprehension is the so-called mutual knowledge hypothesis (Gibbs, 1987), according 
to which the interpretation of utterances in conversation is grounded on a set of 
knowledge and beliefs that listeners share with speakers (Bach & Harnish, 1979, p. 5; 
Leech, 1983, p. 13; Levinson, 1983, p. 16; Schiffer, 1972, p. 39). Mutual or common 
knowledge, also referred to as “context” or “common ground” in several pragmatic 
theories, make communication possible, allowing the speakers to take for granted the 
information needed for retrieving their communicative intention, which would be 
otherwise impossible to provide for every utterance (Clark, 1996, Chapter 4; Stalnaker, 
1978, 2002). 
 The problem of mutual knowledge has been addressed from many perspectives, 
all related to the problems of comprehension, interpretation, and the challenges of 
analyzing the linguistic triggers of presuppositions – namely how common knowledge 
is used in reconstructing meaning and how it is signaled. A dimension of mutual 
understanding that has been practically neglected (Macagno, 2018b; Verdonik, 2010) is 
the lack or the conflict of common grounds, namely what happens when the knowledge 
that the speakers assume to be shared in fact is not known or is controversial. More 
importantly, this gap appears even more evident when we move from the linguistic 
analysis of the products of the interactions – the utterances – to the broader picture of 
the interactions themselves – how they detect, negotiate, and discuss the knowledge that 
is not common to them. This aspect is fundamental to several disciplines, as it relates 
the problem of comprehension with crucial issues such as intercultural communication, 
value comprehension, and cultural inclusion.  
The goal of this paper is to address the relationship between comprehension and 
common ground focusing on the process that allows the development of “cultural 
literacy.” On the perspective of pragmatics and communication, culturally literacy does 
not depend on the amount of knowledge that a speaker holds, but rather on his or her 
disposition to acquire it when it is needed. To this purpose, we will propose a coding 
scheme that allows to capture the moves in a conversation that manifest this disposition, 
showing how they are related to a deeper understanding.   
2. Empathy as a crucial dimension of intercultural dialogue 
The starting point for analyzing the common ground between the interlocutors and the 
possibility of deep understanding also when the background cultures are different is the 
concept of dialogue. Martin Buber defined dialogue through the crucial notion of 
inclusion, which presupposes the conflict between the speaker’s and hearer’s viewpoints 
and backgrounds. According to Buber, a dialogical relation is a relation between 
persons “that is characterized in more or less degree by the element of inclusion,” which 
presupposes the fact that the interlocutors live “through the common event from the 
standpoint of the other” (Buber, 2002[1947], pp. 114–115). According to Buber, the 
possibility of looking at the same state of affairs through the viewpoint of the 
interlocutor is the essence of dialogue, which he distinguishes from other forms of 
disguised monologue, in which the interlocutors simply tolerate each other, avoiding 
open conflicts (Shady & Larson, 2010, p. 87).  
This concept of dialogue is crucial for understanding the balance between 
common ground and diversity: dialogue is characterized by the difference of 
perspectives and is possible because a common ground exists between the interlocutors. 
The difference is bridged by the mutual effort of understanding the other side  (Buber, 
1999[1957], p. 102), without necessarily giving up one’s perspective (Shady & Larson, 
2010, p. 83). Dialogue is thus awareness and understanding of the mutual 
“worldviews,” with all the presuppositions on which they stand and the undertakings 
that they imply (Buber, 1999[1957], p. 103).      
 This dimension of dialogue, characterized by a balance between the 
identification with the interlocutor (which Buber defines as “empathy”) and the mere 
acceptance, or better “tolerance,” of a viewpoint perceived as distinct from and 
incompatible with the speaker’s, was captured by Buber through the concept of 
“inclusion” (Buber, 1999[1957], p. 102). Buber’s terminology hides, however, a 
fundamental relationship between his presuppositions of a real dialogue and the 
contemporary approaches to literacy, dialogue and argumentation. In particular, he 
draws a categorical dichotomy between empathy and inclusion, where the latter concept 
finds no equivalents in our modern theories developed in the fields of psychology, 
dialogue studies, or intercultural dialogue, and the former can be hardly accepted in our 
contemporary understanding of the term. Instead, if we analyze how Buber’s concept of 
inclusion can be addressed and referred to nowadays, we can find this insight as a 
crucial starting point for better understanding the crucial dispositions of the 
interlocutors in a dialogue, which become even more important in an intercultural 
dialogue.  
 To understand Buber’s notion of inclusion, we need to start from its theoretical 
alternative, empathy. Buber uses it with a meaning that suggests a loss of one’s 
individuality: “to transpose” oneself over there and in there.” According to him, being 
empathic means being absorbed by the reality in which one participates, excluding 
one’s concreteness and abstracting from one’s actual situation (Buber, 2002[1947], pp. 
114). This view is very close to the aesthetical root of this word, referring to the 
imaginary bodily perspective taking, the “feeling into” an aesthetic object (Ganczarek, 
Hünefeldt, & Belardinelli, 2018). However, when used outside the aesthetic experience 
to refer to an interaction with another person (empathizing), the meaning of this term is 
different, involving dimensions and processes that are extremely complex and 
controversial in both philosophy and psychology (Goldie, 2000, p. 194).  
 Empathy has been defined in the modern and psychological theories in different 
ways. The crucial difference is traced by the developments of Lipp’s original idea that 
empathy can be conceived as the inner imitation of another’s feelings (Lipps, 1903): the 
direct activation of an emotion through the perception of another’s emotion. This 
proposal led to two crucial different paths (Preston & de Waal, 2002a, p. 2): 1) the 
reduction of the emphatic emotion to a perceptual reaction, leading to equating empathy 
to the experiencing of the feelings of another – especially the negative ones (Elliott, 
Bohart, Watson, & Greenberg, 2011, p. 43) or even to emotional contagion, and 2) the 
distinction between the detection of another’s condition or emotion and the one’s own 
emotional response. This latter approach focuses on the imitation dimension, in which 
the individual who is the source of the emphatic emotion (and his or her emotions) is 
distinguished from the empathizing subject (and his or her empathic emotion), and this 
gap is bridged by either the experiencing or understanding of the other’s emotion 
(Scheler, 2017[1954], pp. 9–11; Zahavi, 2008), or the cognitive understanding of the 
causes of another’s emotion (Goldie, 2000, p. 195). The first approach has been rejected 
by almost all contemporary theories (Preston & de Waal, 2002, p. 4; Scheler, 
2017[1954], pp. 14–16; Zahavi, 2008) as failing to trace the distinction between the 
cause and the possible effect, and most importantly between the self and the other, 
which is considered as the essential dimension of empathy as an “other-centered” 
emotional state (Rogers, 1980, p. 140; Zahavi, 2014, p. 102). In this sense, in Buber’s 
definition of empathy nowadays corresponds to a distinct concept, which could be 
referred to as “emotional contagion” or “emotional infection.”   
 The modern idea of empathy, however, can be compared to Buber’s notion of 
“inclusion.” The common denominator that underlies the different theories (including 
the ones that regard empathy as based on the experience or perception of another’s 
emotion, see Ben-Ze’ev, 2000, p. 110), is a form of understanding of the other (Scheler, 
2017[1954], p. 12). Empathy is regarded as perspective-taking (Elliott et al., 2011, p. 
43), the perception or cognitive understanding of another’s frame of reference, without 
losing the distinction between the self and the other (Rogers, 1980, p. 140). As Zahavi 
put it, “To empathically understand that your friend loves his wife is quite different 
from loving his wife yourself. It doesn’t require you to share his love for his wife” 
(2014, p. 150). According to Goldie, this “otherness” that defines empathy is 
characterized by three components (Goldie, 2000, p. 195):  
  
First, it is necessary for empathy that I be aware of the other as a centre of 
consciousness distinct from myself (cf. Scheler 1954, Deigh 1996, and Peacocke 
1985). Secondly, it is necessary for empathy that the other should be someone of 
whom I have a substantial characterization. Thirdly, it is necessary that I have a 
grasp of the narrative which I can imaginatively enact, with the other as narrator.   
 
The recognition of the other is thus combined with the “narration” of the other 
experience, namely the adoption of the other’s viewpoint (Battaly, 2011, p. 279; Zahavi, 
2014, p. 150) (also called “empathic understanding,” see Ickes, 1993, p. 591), which 
then leads to an experience of the “embodied mind of the other” (according to a 
phenomenological approach) or to a simulation of the other’s feelings based on one’s 
own experiences (according to Goldman, 2006).  
 Buber’s notion of inclusion as understanding of a state of affairs from the 
viewpoint of the other, corresponds to the modern concept of empathy, at least in its 
dimension of perceiving, experiencing, or appraising the other’s perspective, reference, 
and “narrative” (Bennett, 2001, p. 41; Orange, 2011, p. 49). The emphatic aspect of 
dialogue has been stressed in the literature especially in relation to the exchanges 
between speakers belonging to different religions. As Smart pointed out in his concept 
of “structured empathy,” to understand another’s religious position and more 
importantly have a true dialogue with him, it is necessary to “understand his 
understanding of the world, and that constitutes quite a complex structure” (Smart, 
1986, p. 212). Empathy thus implies the suspension of one’s own assumptions to adopt 
the social, philosophical, cultural structures underlying the other’s view (Smart, 2000, p. 
18). 
3. Empathy as a precondition of argumentative dialogue 
According to the theories of empathy outlined above, the essential requirement of a 
genuine dialogue consists in a deeper understanding of the other’s viewpoint, namely 
accessing the presuppositions on which it is grounded. This perspective on dialogue has 
been adapted from the literature on specific intercultural exchanges. However, if we go 
back to the ancient roots of dialogue – developed in the realm of rhetoric – we can find 
a similar acknowledgment of empathic understanding.  
  The core of ancient rhetoric is the enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism. Aristotle 
described the enthymeme as a syllogism (an argument) with fewer premises than the 
ordinary ones (Gough & Tindale, 1985; Sorensen, 1988). A clear example that Aristotle 
provides is the following (Aristotle, Rhetoric. 1357a19-22): Dorieus has won a crown, 
as he has won the Olympic games. The conclusion is drawn from an assumption (the 
prize for the Olympic games is a crown) that everybody knows. However, as Aristotle 
points out, most of enthymemes are based on premises that hold only generally, as they 
are only commonly accepted (Walker, 1994, p. 47; Walton, 2001, p. 106). While most 
of the dialectical (logical or definition-based) inferences are considered as essential (as 
grounded on irrebuttable logic semantic relations such as genus-species), rhetorical 
inferences are only likely, namely generally accepted. Enthymemes rest on a premise 
that consists in the specification or application of a “commonplace” or warrant 
(guaranteeing the passage from the premise to the conclusion Hitchcock, 1998) to the 
subject matter under discussion. For example, in the aforementioned syllogism the 
commonplace “where is the cause, there is also the effect” is used by drawing on the 
assumption that the crown is an effect of winning the Olympic games (Rigotti, 2008). 
This premise is shared only by whom knows how Olympic games work, and to the 
extent that the rules thereof do not change. This epistemic aspect of enthymematic 
premises is considered as the reason of their implicit nature (Braet, 1999, p. 107): if 
something is presumed shared by the audience, there is no need to mention it. Thus, the 
orator has to weight between the risk of taking for granted a premise that is not shared 
(resulting in a general disagreement) and the danger of making explicit what is not 
necessary (implicitly admitting that he does not know his audience). 
 Aristotle developed the relationship between the audience and the enthymeme 
when he analyzed the maxims, namely the generalizations that can be used as implicit 
guarantees for rhetorical conclusions. Aristotle pointed out that general statements (such 
as “Nothing is more annoying than having neighbors”) can be used in certain contexts 
and with certain interlocutors, but not others. For this reason, “the orator has […] to 
guess the subjects on which his hearers really hold views already, and what those views 
are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same subjects” 
(Aristotle, Rhetoric. 1395b5-12). The implicit premise of the enthymeme (which can 
correspond to maxims) represents the its context-oriented dimension. The speaker can 
take a premise for granted because he or she can assume that it is so accepted by his or 
her audience that there is no need to make it explicit and submit it to the audience’s 
evaluation (Macagno, 2018a; Tindale, 1999, p. 112).  
 The nature of the rhetorical argument is thus essentially related to its 
appropriateness to the circumstances, which was referred to as the “kairos” (Kinneavy, 
2002; Kinneavy & Eskin, 2000, p. 437). According to Aristotle, the rhetorical art is 
grounded on the capacity of the orator to understand what the audience considers likely 
and acceptable in a given time (Untersteiner, 1954). Ethical and emotional arguments in 
particular need to be developed considering the situation of the interlocutors, namely the 
event and the values that can trigger a value judgment. The speaker needs to take into 
account and ground his or her arguments on what is likely to be true or acceptable for a 
specific audience (Viano, 1955, p. 281).   
 The ancient notion of kairos highlights a relationship between speaker and 
audience that has been developed in the contemporary argumentation theories under 
different concepts essentially related to empathy. One of the cornerstones of 
argumentation (the development of ancient dialectics) is the notion of commitment, 
namely the propositions that the interlocutors are expected or (according to the theory) 
held to defend and be consistent with (Hamblin, 1970, Chapter 8). Speakers, however, 
are not only committed to what they say, but to a set of propositions that constitute the 
background, or the presuppositions, of their discourse. The explicit (or light-side) 
commitments are thus distinguished from the dark-side ones, namely the unarticulated 
propositions that are the tacit grounds of explicit arguments or value judgments 
(Walton, 1987, p. 144). Dark-side commitments are crucial for understanding the deeper 
premises on which the interlocutor bases his or her viewpoint. Unless such premises are 
addressed, the argumentative dialogue cannot undermine the other’s view, leading to a 
change of perspective. For this reason, Walton underscored the essential role of 
empathy: according to him, empathy is the ability to put oneself inside the interlocutor’s 
position in an argument (Walton, 1992, p. 255), discovering the values and the 
assumptions that are fundamental for understanding why a certain viewpoint was 
endorsed.  
 This central role of empathy in dialogue and argumentation has also been 
stressed by Gilbert (Gilbert, 1995, 1997, Chapter 8), who pointed out how a speaker’s 
position (a speaker’s viewpoint on an issue) does not consist merely in the expression of 
a proposition (i.e. a claim). Rather, it is “like the tip of an iceberg:” to understand a 
position it is necessary to uncover all the assumptions that are presuppositions of or 
related with the claim (Gilbert, 1995, p. 839). On this view, to reach an agreement it is 
necessary to address the interlocutor’s position, namely all the relevant beliefs, 
attitudes, emotions, insights, and values connected to a claim (Gilbert, 1995, p. 840). 
For this reason, the goal of reaching an agreement presupposes understanding a 
position, which in turn requires knowing why the interlocutor holds this position, and 
what he or she thinks and feel about it. Deep understanding is thus the crucial 
dimension of argumentation (Gilbert, 1995, p. 843):  
 
One cannot be said to properly understand a position unless one can comprehend 
all that the position entails, and can, at least theoretically, put oneself in the place 
of a holder of that position. But putting oneself in the place of a dispute partner 
necessarily goes well beyond adopting the propositional component identified as 
the claim. It includes taking on the world view, adopting the attitudes and 
values, the very psychic mantle of one's dispute partner.  
 As mentioned above, this view of dialogue is rooted in the Aristotelian and classical 
concept of kairos, which in turn places empathy at the center of the strategies of 
addressing the audience. In order to be persuasive or overcome a disagreement, it is 
crucial to place oneself in the other’s position. Understanding the words uttered is not 
enough; it is necessary understanding what lies beneath them, the set of “dark-side 
commitments” or beliefs, values, attitudes on which they are grounded. In this sense, 
dialogues, and in particular argumentative dialogues, depend on understanding, which 
in turn is matter of empathy.  
4. Coding empathy – otherness  
In the previous sections, we showed how a dialogue that can be considered truly 
intersubjective depends on the emphatic relation between the interlocutors. Emotional 
contagion and tolerance represent the two extremes of a dialogical relationship where 
empathy represents the necessary balance. But what is empathy, and more importantly 
what is empathy in dialogue? The psychological and philosophical theories of empathy 
seem to agree on one crucial point, namely that it presupposes the understanding of a 
state of affair from the viewpoint of the other. The rhetorical perspective adds another 
crucial aspect to this complex picture: the adoption of the other’s viewpoint is possible 
only if one intends and manages to uncover the set of “dark-side commitments” related 
to what is expressed in a dialogue (see also the almost identical notion in conflict 
management, De Wied, Branje, & Meeus, 2007). More importantly, if we conceive 
empathy as perspective talking (Gehlbach, 2004), it implies that we are adopting the 
view of another, which may be different from ours (Johnson, 1975, p. 241). In this 
sense, recognizing the other, with all his or her differences, is the essential condition of 
empathy and thus authentic dialogue. This premise, however, leads to a crucial problem: 
how is it possible to capture this emphatic otherness of discourse?  
 The literature on argumentation can be of little help in this endeavor, as 
rhetorical and argument studies tend to focus more on the contents (the logic and 
expression) of what is said rather than the how dialogues are co-constructed, and the 
positions discussed interactively. The area of study where the attitudes manifested in 
discourse have been taken into serious account is the analysis of educational dialogue1.  
In this field, scholars have paid attention more to how children develop fundamental 
dialogical skills and how such abilities evolve, in order to design the best strategies for 
promoting them. Here we find a first and crucial attempt to coding the dimension of 
discourse otherness, detected through the notion of “transactivity.”   
In their work on moral development through moral conflict discussions, 
Berkowitz and Gibbs brought to light the role of transactive discussions (1983, 1985), 
namely expressions of reasoning that, instead of merely providing consecutive 
assertions, “confronts the other’s antithetical reasoning in an ongoing dialogic dynamic” 
(Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983, p. 402). These types of units of dialogue promote 
justifications for moral positions, which highlight the flaws in each other’s moral 
assumptions underlying their own positions. In this approach, “transacts” or 
 
1  While the “conversational” analysis of educational discourse has focused on different aspects of 
empathy, this dimension has been only recently analyzed in other types of verbal activities, such as 
medical interactions, in which empathy is commonly investigated as the inclusion of or reference to the 
other’s view in one’s own speech (Ruusuvuori, 2005).  
transactional units of dialogue, are divided in two groups: representational and 
operational. While the former units represent or elicit the other’s position (including 
feedback requests, paraphrases, justification requests, and juxtapositions of the different 
or conflicting positions), the latter consist in units that are aimed at developing, 
clarifying, attacking and supporting a position. The latter transacts are divided in the 
following ten categories (Berkowitz & Gibbs, 1983, pp. 404–405, 1985, pp. 75–76):  
 
Clarification 
 
(a) No, what I am trying to say is the following. 
(b) Here is a clarification of my position to aid in your 
understanding. 
Competitive 
Clarification 
My position is not necessarily what you take it to be. 
Refinement (a) I must refine my position or point as a concession to your 
position (subordinative mode) 
(b) I can elaborate or qualify my position to defend against 
your critique or point. (superordinative mode). 
Extension (a) Here is a further thought or an elaboration offered in the 
spirit of your position. 
(b) Are you implying the following by your reasoning? 
 
Contradiction There is a logical inconsistency in your reasoning. 
Reasoning 
Critique 
(a) Your reasoning misses an important distinction. or 
involves a superfluous distinction. 
(b) Your position implicitly involves an assumption that is 
questionable (“premise attack”). 
(c) Your reasoning does not necessarily lead to your 
conclusion/opinion, or your opinion has not been 
sufficiently justified. 
(d) Your reasoning applies equally well to the opposite 
opinion. 
Competitive 
Extension 
(a) Would you go to this implausible extreme with your 
reasoning? 
(b) Your reasoning can be extended to the following extreme, 
with which neither of us would agree 
Counter 
Consideration 
Here is a thought or element that cannot be incorporated into 
your position. 
Common 
Ground 
integration 
(a) We can combine our positions into a common view. 
(b) Here is a general premise common to both of our positions. 
Comparative 
Critique 
(a) Your reasoning is less adequate than mine because it is 
incompatible with the important consideration here. 
(b) Your position makes a distinction which is seen as 
superfluous in light of my position, or misses an important 
distinction which my position makes. 
(c) I can analyze your example to show that it does not pose a 
challenge to my position. 
 
Table 1: Transactional units 
 
The notion of transactivity became a crucial concept in psychology and education. 
Kruger and Tomasello (1986) used this construct to detect the otherness dimension of 
peer-peer vs peer-adult dialogues, and the differences between the distinct strategies for 
“including” the other in one’s discourse (by requesting clarifications or by developing 
arguments based on the interlocutor’s). The classification between self-oriented and 
other-oriented transacts was developed further by Teasley (1997), who distinguished the 
strategies used for making one’s viewpoint clearer from the ones aimed at operating 
properly on the other’s reasoning. This distinction shed light on the equal importance of 
intrapersonal dialogical processes (aimed at operating on one’s own reasoning) and 
interpersonal ones, showing how they are distinct phases of the same process of 
dialogically deeper understanding one’s viewpoints. Transactive units have been also 
used as a criterion of “coherence” in Felton and Kuhn’s (2001) coding system, in which 
they distinguish the statements that connect to the partner’s utterance (in form of a 
question, challenge, or comment) from the ones that ignore the interlocutor’s move 
(Felton & Kuhn, 2001, p. 140). This distinction was used to capture the quality of 
argumentative behavior (in this case, the strategic behavior, i.e. the conduct aimed at 
achieving the goals of argumentative discourse), distinguishing non-strategic behavior 
(non-transactive moves) from the strategic ones.  
  The concept of transactivity has been thus developed in the literature as a form 
of operationalizing empathy at two different levels, namely the dialogical involvement 
of the other (addressing what he said), and the textual connectedness with the preceding 
discourse and the goal of the interaction. The “interactional” and “textual” dimensions 
of dialogue represent two manifestations of empathy, or more specifically “otherness” – 
empathy as involving the other, and empathy as talking to the other. The first category 
(which we will refer to as “dialogicity”) was further elaborated on by distinguishing the 
two distinct dimensions of understanding, namely challenging (the dialogical aspect of 
transactivity) and understanding (clarifying one’s thought and asking for clarifications). 
The latter dimension, which in linguistics is commonly referred to as “relevance” 
(Macagno, 2019), was, however, confined only to a very vague criterion, capturing only 
one specific aspect of the relationship between the participants’ moves.  
 This operationalization framework can be developed by considering the 
manifestation of both dimensions.    
5. Operationalizing otherness in coding peer-to-peer educational dialogues    
The concept of empathy can be operationalized considering its dimension of dialogical 
otherness, namely including the other in one’s dialogue, which partly corresponds to the 
idea of transactivity developed in the literature. However, otherness/transactivity has 
two aspects, a structural and a pragmatic one. The structural aspect concerns the 
potentiality of a dialogical move: some moves have been acknowledged in the literature 
as more transactive than others due to their purpose (giving reasons, expanding, etc.). 
We will capture this potential, structural aspect as the “dialogicity” of a move, in the 
sense that a move can be more or less dialogical, namely can potentially lead to a more 
or less deep dialogue that takes into account the other’s view.   
However, to be actually transactive, these moves need to be related to the other’s 
viewpoint, move, or at least the topic under discussion. They need to be part of the 
dialogue agreed upon by the interlocutors and developed by them. The “actual” 
transactivity is thus defined by a distinct criterion, relevance. A move needs to be 
relevant to another (or at least to the dialogue) to be transactive; otherwise, it is simply 
non-transactive as irrelevant. At the same time, relevance does not modify the level of 
dialogicity of a move – a relevant low-dialogical move will result in a low-transactive 
one.  
In the following coding schemes (Table 2), “otherness/transactivity” is captured 
by the two proxies of dialogicity and relevance.  
 
Otherness 
Types of dialogical moves 
Relevance 
Low dialogicity High dialogicity 
• Stating (ST) • Inviting (IN) 
• Irrelevant/No transactivity (-): 
when the move is off-task/off-
topic or it does not refer to a 
previously stated contribution 
by another speaker 
• Relevant/Actual transactivity 
(+): when the move directly 
refers to a previously stated 
contribution by another speaker, 
or to the current state of 
dialogue in the case of “meta-
dialogical” o “managerial” 
moves.  
• Accepting/Dis
carding 
(AC/DC) 
• Expanding 
(EX) 
• Managerial 
(MA) 
• Reasoning 
(RE) 
 
• Meta-
dialogical 
(MD) 
  
Table 2: Empathy coding categories 
 
The specific description of the moves is provided below.  
 
 5.2. Structural level: low dialogicity  
 
The moves with a low level of dialogicity are characterized by their lack of inclusion of 
the other’s perspective. These moves do not directly address or elicit the other’s 
viewpoint, but are rather the condition of more dialogical moves.   
 
Stating (S): This coding category refers to “representations,” namely the 
conveyance of information, viewpoints, and value judgments on a state of affair or 
another viewpoint (Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 62). This code includes any act of stating 
or asserting that something is true or false without defending such assertion. It refers to 
any simple statement of an idea or fact or opinion without any dialogical intent of either 
justifying it to someone (which would probably make it an “expressing an argument” 
category) or asking for someone’s opinion about such statement (which would probably 
make it an “inviting” category). 
  
Accepting/Discarding (AC/DC): Any act of accepting, acknowledging (AC), 
challenging or rejecting (DC) an opinion or a state of affair put forward by another 
speaker, without providing further reasons (otherwise it would be a Reasoning move) 
and without considering background values used as presuppositions or linguistic 
terminology (otherwise it would be Metadialogical). It can range from a simple 
expression of a positive or negative reaction (e.g., yeah, aha, you are right, correct/ no, 
not true, I disagree, etc.) to a more elaborated sign of agreement with another person’s 
perspective or opinion, either through restating it or reformulating it, but without 
justifying such agreement. Any addition of information remains at a textual level 
without the intent of making the others understand or improve their understanding 
regarding a previously expressed piece of discourse and without the formulation of a 
new idea. 
 
Managerial (MA): This category, characterizing especially classroom 
discussions but adaptable to other institutional contexts, refers to any explicit reference 
to one or more steps of a task execution, for example, work distribution, sub-tasks to do, 
time management, etc. When the task is a reasoning task, for example exploring a 
concept, other categories apply. The procedural code is only used to refer to physical or 
management actions, such as: keeping notes, group leader role assignment, organizing 
materials, etc.  
 
5.3. Moves with a high level of dialogicity 
 
As defined above, otherness/transactivity is the quality of a move to include the other’s 
perspective. It is possible to distinguish between four categories of moves. The first 
distinction concerns the level of the discussion, whether it is focused on the topic or on 
the conditions of the dialogue itself (Metadialogical). The second distinction concerns 
the viewpoint, whether it already exists, or it is elicited. The last distinction concerns 
how a viewpoint is addressed, whether by clarifying it or defending/attacking it.  
 
Inviting (IN): This coding category refers to any explicit invitation to another 
person for him/her to express his/her opinion, ideas, understandings, etc., either as an 
indication of authentic interest towards the others’ perspective or as a re-voicing of a 
previously emerged contribution/request for contribution. 
 
Expanding (EX): This category refers to any effort of extending or emphasizing 
one’s own or another’s individual or shared perception about the issue at hand. It can 
take several forms, such as: (request for) giving an example, adding details, extending a 
thought, expressing doubt about someone’s ideas, clarifying something that was 
ambiguous, etc.  
 
Reasoning (Expressing an argument or counterargument) (R): This category 
refers to a class of conversational actions characterized by the disputable nature of the 
subject matter (Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 62), and includes arguments or 
counterarguments (where the doubt or potential dissent is taken for granted in the need 
of providing a justification). This code refers to any expression of a more or less 
justified idea about an issue at hand, which moves dialogue forward.  
Metadialogical (MD): Metadialogical actions “describe the behavior of the 
speaker when he is doing something else besides ‘taking his turn’,” not moving the 
conversation further, but rather making a further contribution possible, relevant, and 
coherent (Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 60). This move refers to any verbal effort to 
explicitly make a connection between the current state of the dialogue (and/or its 
understanding) and its supposed/expected goal related to the activity in course.  
   
5.4. Transactivity 
 
Relevance (+/-): This code refers to the type or relation of a move with the 
previous ones. Any contribution which is either off-task (non-transcribed interaction) or 
off-topic (transcribed interaction which is both incoherent and irrelevant to the dialogue 
contents) or off-goal (transcribed interaction which is interactionally coherent but 
irrelevant to the dialogue goal as implied by the analyst) is considered as irrelevant (-). 
If a move is coded as irrelevant, then every move addressing it must also be coded as 
irrelevant.  
The degree of relevance (- or +), to be mentioned next to every low-dialogicity 
type of move (Stating, Managerial, Accepting/Discarding), refers to how related such 
move is to the topic under discussion or to the task/activity at hand. In both cases, the 
‘reasoning by exclusion’ rule applies, namely: if it not irrelevant, then it is relevant. 
The highly dialogical moves of Inviting, Expanding, Reasoning and 
Metadialogical are marked as of high relevance when their dialogical transactivity is 
manifested. The passage from a textual to a dialogical level is decided following this 
rationale: if I expand without having in mind that I want to make myself understood, 
then it is Expanding with a low transactivity. If I express my opinions without having in 
mind that I want to prove my reasoning as valid, then it is Reasoning with a low 
transactivity. And if I refer to the dialogue process or activity itself without the intention 
of a genuine reflection on the dialogue goals, then it is Metadialogical with a low 
transactivity 
 
5.5. Code predominance 
 
The more dialogical code prevails over the less dialogical. For example, a sequence of 
the kind:  
 
Yeah, you are right, but I think that the problem of migration needs to be 
considered as an international problem.  
 
The assumption is that a clause (whether dependent or independent) uttered for no-
dialogical or less dialogical purposes and followed by a dialogically used clause can be 
considered as a preamble to it, or as an introduction or connective strategy. The 
prevalence of the dialogical over the non-dialogical is based on the assumption that 
sequences express one interactional (social) goal, namely one specific function that they 
play within the discourse (Macagno & Bigi, 2017; Merin, 1994, p. 238; Stubbs, 1983, 
Chapter 8.2; Walton, 2007; Widdowson, 1979, p. 144). The core of the “social” or 
interactive act is the actual way that it modifies the interaction (Widdowson, 1979, p. 
144):  
 
I am sure that it is a mistake to suppose that one participant’s responses are 
simply reactions to what the other has said: they are, rather, readjustments to his 
own communicative intents. As I have already suggested, verbal interactions 
resemble games of chess: each participant works out his moves in advance and 
modifies them tactically as the encounter develops. In a serious game, analogous 
to academic argument, each player will be trying to project his own pattern on 
the game and to force his opponent into error, or at least into a move which can 
be turned to advantage. 
 
While conversations cannot be compared to this kind of strategic behaviour, more 
dialogical moves affect more deeply the conversational structure of the discourse than 
mere interactional ones (whose dialogical nature is less explicit or less present). Thus, in 
the case mentioned above, we notice two distinct codes capturing two distinct 
communicative intentions: an interactive one (an acknowledgment) and a dialogical one 
(an argument against a possible different viewpoint). In this case, the two intentions are 
not on the same level. The overall effect of the turn is to advance a grounded viewpoint, 
resulting in a deeper “readjustment” of the interlocutor’s communicative options 
(Ducrot, 1972). The first intention is ancillary to the latter, acting as a cohesion 
mechanism.  
Generalizing this principle, the more dialogical code prevails over the less 
dialogical based on the principle of detecting the resulting effect of the turn. When the 
turn in fact elicits two distinct communicative effects, it needs to be segmented 
accordingly, resulting in two distinct codes. 
 
5.6. Decision tree 
 
The aforementioned distinction can be summarized and represented in a decision-tree. 
The proxies described above are mutually exclusive, as they are intended to capture the 
possible functions of the utterances in a dialogue considering a specific dimension of 
dialogical behaviour, i.e. empathy (Bellack, Kliebard, Hyman, & Smith, 1966). This 
“category system” provides a set of dichotomic choices that are presented at Figure 1 
below.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Decision tree 
This decision tree allows determining the empathy codes for each move at levels of its 
structure and relevance, guiding the coding of texts.  
6. Conclusion 
Empathy is crucial concept for communication and argumentation. It is the key to 
understanding how the interlocutors interact and do not simply engage in unconnected 
remarks (or interactions similar to pseudo-dialogues Mustajoki, Sherstinova, & 
Tuomarla, 2018). Empathy has been defined in accordance with the philosophical and 
psychological literature as the understanding of a state of affairs from the viewpoint of 
the other, namely the consideration of the other world view and system of values 
underlying a position. This definition is line with the ancient concept of kairos in the 
rhetorical tradition and Gilbert’s contemporary notion of deep understanding.  
 This framework has been used to develop a system for detecting signals of 
empathy in discourse, starting from the notion of transactivity that is a key notion in 
educational studies. The reference to and the inclusion of another’s move or turn in 
one’s speech is considered as a manifestation of empathy in discourse; however, the 
problem was to functionalize this intuitive concept. In this paper, we have presented two 
interconnected criteria – a typology of moves and their relevance. The first criterion 
captures the potentiality of a move to address or include the other’s perspective. More 
dialogical – in the sense of potentially transactive – moves are thus distinguished from 
the less dialogical ones. These moves can become actual indicators of empathy when 
they are relevant, namely actually connected with the rest of the discourse, promoting 
the continuation thereof.  
 These coding criteria clearly identify only what is manifested in dialogues, and 
the complex phenomenon of empathy is reduced to only one of its aspects and 
expressions – the consideration of the other’s viewpoint in its depth, which comprises 
the reasons underlying it. The actual use of this coding system depends on its future 
developments, which need to include its validation and reliability.  
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